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be construed as a label for perceptible objects or events puts it outside the scope of most modern accounts
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as its language teachers. The results corroborate the hypothesis that affect or volition plays a pivotal role in
the acquisition process. Negation words are prosodically salient within prohibitive utterances and negative
intent interpretations such that they can be easily isolated from the teacher’s speech signal. These words
subsequentlymay be grounded in negative affective states. However, observations of the nature of prohibition
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1 INTRODUCTION
In research on early language, we often find the claim that children’s early productive vocabularies
were dominated by nouns referring to concrete objects such as foods or toys. This assumption
appears to have been picked up and reinforced by work in robotics on symbol grounding (cf.
Stramandinoli et al. [48]). As a consequence there are plenty of studies that focus on the acquisition
of precisely these types of words [20].
The importance ofmutual or joint reference betweenmothers and children to perceptible objects
and events is emphasized by more recent, so called usage-based theories of language development
[51]. Mother, child, and external referent make up a triadic joint-attentional frame that is very
much the focus of these later theories. Cognitively such triadic interactional constellations are
more complex than a simple dyadic interaction.
In those areas of developmental robotics concernedwith language acquisition in artificial agents,
the linguistic units in focus are similarly those that can be construed as referents for concrete phys-
ical objects, object properties, or perceptible events. Central in this area of research is the notion of
symbol grounding, the construction of links between abstract symbols and signals or constructs
that are based on the embodiment of the agent [18]. The construction of such links may be re-
garded as a form of sense making with respect to the linguistic entities under consideration. The
linguistic units in question are typically words or simple grammatical constructions. The agent’s
embodiment often presents itself with respect to a stream of sensorimotor data.
In stark contrast to this focus on concrete referents, and the words that label them, is the obser-
vation that amongst the very first words produced by a toddler are many that do not fall into this
category. We find words such as “no,” “hi,” or “bye” [11], which are sometimes referred to as social
words. Negation words are thus amongst the very first words in many toddlers’ active vocabularies
and are used by them to reject things or to self-prohibit [17, 53], the latter being a function that
is rarely seen with adult speakers. The idea to link these social words with a robot’s sensorimotor
data appears strangely inappropriate. The question then is how these types of words should be
handled in an embodied language acquisition framework. In the following, we will provide one
possible answer to this question.
1.1 Overview
1.1.1 Location ofWork. The presentedwork pulls together several strands and areas of research
to answer the questions where the earliest forms of linguistic negation may originate from, and
how they may be acquired by a linguistically incompetent learner. The theoretical motivation and
background are mainly located in developmental psychology and psycholinguistics, with the most
important author being Roy D. Pea who wrote his dissertation on this subject [32] (summarized
in Pea [33]).
On the methodological level, and given that our experiments crucially involve dyads consisting
of humans and a small humanoid robot, the work falls into the area of Human-Robot Interaction
(HRI). In no less important ways it builds up upon recent research on symbol grounding in devel-
opmental and cognitive robotics [7, 34, 35, 39, 40]. We adopt a constructive, or synthetic, approach
to cognitive science that has been termed ‘cognitive developmental robotics’ elsewhere [2]. Under
this approach robots are used to elucidate naturally occuring cognitive processes and phenomena.
Additionally, we combine this approach with linguistically unrestricted human-robot interaction
as language acquisition is an inherently social and interpersonal process. Taking the social aspect
of this process seriously has direct methodological consequences. Social processes are necessarily
distributed across two or more agents. This means that the appropriate unit of analysis is the dyad
or group, rather than the individual. In terms of machine learning this implies, that we need to
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widen our analytical scope such that it extends beyond the individual learner’s brain. This brings
attributes and phenomena into scope that would be overlooked otherwise. One such attribute is
the timing of linguistic productions that, as we will show later, has important consequences for
the success rate of the acquisition or learning algorithm.
The main experiment on the role of prohibition in negation acquisition described in the present
publication was designed in tandem with an experiment on so called intent interpretations de-
scribed in [14]. The two experiments were jointly designed to achieve maximum alignment for
the purpose of comparability. We will therefore frequently refer to the latter as rejection exper-
iment and will use it as comparative “benchmark”. Both negation experiments crucially involve
affect or motivation, and both build up on “non-affective” work on robotic language acquisition
conducted by Saunders et al. [38–40]. The experimental setup of both negation experiments and
the work of Saunders et al. are similar to such a degree that they allow us to conduct comparisons
between participants’ speech between these experiments. The most important difference between
the two negation and Saunders’ experiment is that the latter did not model affect. Contrary to the
two negation experiments, Saunders’ experiment was genuinely concerned with the acquisition
of referentially concrete nouns, verbs, and adjectives. However, all three experiments utilized the
same robot and took place in the same room with the same physical setup to render the results
comparable.
In terms of its location within HRI, the present work might be considered unusual in that we
use HRI as a methodological tool to answer questions that, in principle, lay outside of the field.
Rather than attempting to come up with design principles for robots or robotic behavior, or trying
to shed light on human preferences with respect to robots, with the aim of improving human-robot
interaction, we use a combination of HRI and developmental robotics as testbed for developmental
theories of language acquisition. As is customary for constructive approaches, we simultaneously
try to gain insights that help to improve the design of cognitive architectures and inform socially
oriented machine learning.
1.1.2 Research Aim and Research Questions. The overarching aim of both the prohibition ex-
periment, presented in the present publication, and the rejection experiment, presented elsewhere
[14], is to understand the developmental origin of linguistic negation. Where do the first actively
used negation words of human toddlers, chiefly “no,” originate, and how do toddlers learn to use
them? Given that we use a constructive methodology, these questions more or less equate to the
question: Based on our current understanding of the developmental origins of negation, are we
able to build a machine that is able to acquire negation words in a similar fashion as humans do?
More specifically, and given the focus of this work on Spitz’ hypothesis described below (Section 2),
this translates to the following research questions:
Can we replicate the interpersonal mechanism proposed by Spitz’ on the origin of linguistic negation
in silico, that is, by having human-robot dyads as “stand-ins” for parent-child ones?
Granted that this replication involves a number of processes and components, this question breaks
down into the research questions Q2 to Q5 below. Question 1 is more general in that it forms
the basis of both negation experiments and is not specific in terms of the concrete hypothesized
mechanism.
(Q1) Can we corroborate the psycholinguistic hypothesis that affect or motivation are nec-
essary requirements for the acquisition of linguistic negation using a constructive or
synthetic approach involving human-robot dyads?
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(Q2) Do human participants, when confronted with a defiant humanoid robot, and in a situ-
ation where the robot tries to touch forbidden objects, produce linguistic prohibitions?
(Q3) If yes, are these prohibitions good sources of negation words, that is, do they contain
negation words, and if yes, are these prosodically salient?
(Q4) If yes, how do prohibitions compare to negative intent interpretations both in terms of
the frequency of the contained negation words as well as their prosodic saliency rates?
(Q5) If all of the above holds, then will the felicity rate of the robot’s active uses of negation
words improve in response to the more frequent presence of negation words and relative
to the baseline established by the rejection experiment?
1.1.3 Overview of Paper. In the remaining part of the Introduction, we will point out the con-
tributions made in the presented work and introduce the notion of symbol grounding. Symbol
grounding plays a central role in the language acquisition architecture described in Section 3.
Moreover, symbol grounding may constitute the main difference between embodied approaches
to language acquisition, and disembodied approaches that are more common in natural language
processing.
Section 2 highlights the role of affect or motivation in early language acquisition, describes
the rationale behind the two negation experiments, and gives a high-level description how we
operationalize motivation or affect in both the experimental setup and the cognitive architecture.
Section 3 describes the study setup and sketches the cognitive architecture that formed the basis
of both the robot behavior as well as the learning components involved in the acquisition process
on the robot’s side.
Section 4 describes the methodology for analysing the negative speech produced by both human
participants and robot within the experiment. A central part of the analysis form two functional or
speech act taxonomies that were developed to categorize the negative utterances that we observed
in the experiments. The first taxonomy extends Pea’s taxonomy of negative child utterances, the
second one was developed as “symmetric” counterpart to the first taxonomy to categorize par-
ticipants’ negative speech. This section also translates the research questions from the previous
section into hypothesis formulated in terms of the experimental variables.
Section 5 describes the results of the analysis conducted on the gathered speech and interac-
tion data. Participants’ negative speech is analysed on three levels: utterances, corpus (or word),
and functional level. This allows use to link word frequencies to speech act or type frequencies
and draw conclusions as to where the negative words in the robots lexicon originated from. The
robot’s negative speech that it eventually produced is judged both for its adequacy or felicity in
the respective conversational and interactional context as well as for its functional types. Felicity
rates of the robot’s speech, as judged by external coders, are subsequently statistically compared
between the two negation experiments.
Section 6 finally discusses the findings of the experiment.
1.2 Contributions
The present work makes the following contributions:
• We present the first example of a cognitive architecture that operationalizes affect and mo-
tivation for the purpose of symbol grounding.
• The negation experiments described herein provide a first example of a robot that acquires
negation words such as “no” from the unconstrained speech of a human tutor
• We provide constructive quantitative support for the hypothesis that parental prohibition
may constitute (a part of) the developmental origin of human linguistic negation (Spitz’
hypothesis)
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• Under the assumption that Spitz’ hypothesis is true, our experimental data provides sup-
port to counter the hypothesis that the core learning mechanism underlying word learning
is mainly a process of association (Hebbian learning in the wider sense). Given the stated
assumption, more powerful core learning mechanisms are likely to be required, with rein-
forcement learning being a likely candidate.
1.3 Symbol Grounding
Artificial symbol grounding, or perceptual symbol systems [4], attempt to solve or break out of
the symbol grounding problem, the formulation of which is frequently attributed to Harnad [18]:
If symbols are recursively defined or explained merely by the concatenation of other symbols, as
is the case in a dictionary, then how can the agent make sense of such symbols given the often
circular relationship between the explanandum and explanans (see Reference [34] for an exam-
ple)? The principle method employed in solving this problem is to connect some or all symbols of
the system to sensorimotor data that originates in the agent’s own embodiment: its visual sensors,
its haptic sensors, its auditory perception, or any kind of derivative constructs that are computed
from data originating from such sensory channels. The way existing symbol grounding systems
differ from each other is mainly in the method how the link between symbolic and sensor-derived
data is established. The methods for constructing and maintaining such links may involve neural
networks [7, 49], symbolic artificial intelligence approaches [10, 42, 46], statistical learning meth-
ods [47], or methods inspired by an enactive approach [25, 26]. The latter are typically data-driven
and, arguably, representation-free in the sense that no models of object or event categories are
constructed. Technically, this is made possible through the use of lazy learning algorithms [1],
which compute retrieval or classification requests directly on the “remembered” data.
The notion of symbol grounding is ambiguous in more than one way. On one hand, it is used
both in a static and dynamic way. In the dynamic variant, authors use the word to describe the
wider processes through which symbolic and sensor data come to be associated with each other.
In the static variant the focus is more narrowly on the details of the relationship between the
“groundee”, typically the sensorimotor data, and the grounded, the symbol. On the other hand,
symbol grounding has also been used in the context of “common ground” in the modelling of
dialogues. We refer to Kennington et al. [23], who briefly discuss the differences and for further
pointers into the literature. In the following, we will use symbol grounding in the first sense of the
word, and mostly in its static meaning.
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the existing work on symbol grounding focuses on
and is limited to the grounding of words that may be seen to either refer to concrete objects (“con-
crete nouns”) or to temporally unfolding perceptible events and processes (“concrete verbs”). More
recently Stramandinoli et al. [48] provided an example for grounding more abstract verbs such as
“use” or “make” on the back of already grounded concrete verbs such as “cut” or “slide.” While this
is certainly an improvement in terms of the ability to ground a more general class of words, it is
not clear how this approach would help to ground social or socio-pragmatic words such as “no,”
“yes,” or “hi,” or emotion words such as “sad” or “upset.” The present work is therefore not an
argument in favour or against any of the particular established symbol grounding methods. More
generally, it is an attempt at widening the scope of what symbols can be grounded in. Instead
of solely grounding words in sensorimotor data, or derivatives thereof, we advocate in favour of
widening the scope of potential grounding targets to encompass affect or motivation.
2 NEGATION AND AFFECT IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
Authors such as Pea emphasize the significance of affect in the context of acquisition of early
linguistic negation [33]. Less well understood are the concrete ramifications of this primacy of
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affect for a cognitive architecture in terms of required components, learning mechanisms, or the
dynamics of the learning process. Hence roboticists have so far been unable to create machines
that could acquire and engage in this aspect of human speech.
2.1 Spitz’ Hypothesis
Spitz’ hypothesis [44], as summarized in Pea [33], asserts that infants’ major source of negation
words is rooted in parental prohibitive utterances that occur in conjunction with the child’s “in-
complete act.” The latter is thought to cause a “frustration of the child’s id drives” and negative
affect. The child is subsequently thought to associate this negative “affective cathexis” with the
negative word or gesture. Via role reversal, or, in Pea’s words, “the identification with the prohibit-
ing parent” the child is then thought to use these negative symbols for the purpose of rejection. It
is important to notice that this hypothesis, as summarised by Pea, does not specify what precisely
causes the child’s act to be incomplete. However, the tacit assumption seems to be that the parent
has some non-trivial role in this. Technically, what or who precisely is the cause of frustration is
an important point, as we will discuss in Section 6.
2.2 Intent Interpretations
An alternative, yet mutually non-exclusive, hypothesis on the origin of children’s first negation
words involves the notion of intent interpretations. Intent interpretations are linguistic descrip-
tions or ascriptions of the addressee’s affective or volitional state. Ryan hypothesized that they
played a vital role for infants to learn how to express their intent [37]. Pea subsequently observed
that such intent interpretations often contain lexical negatives when the target expressions involve
negative affect or motivation [33]. Based on this observation, we hypothesized that precisely these
intent interpretations may constitute an alternative source for the learner’s first negation words.
The mechanism here is simpler than in the case of prohibition in that it simply requires the regular
temporal co-occurrence of negative affect and negative word. Role reversal or identification with
the parent are not needed.
2.3 Rejection Experiment
In the rejection experiment [14], we tested whether the robot’s display of affect would trigger in-
tent interpretations on part of our participants akin to what Pea and Ryan had observed in parent-
child dyads. Given our focus on negation, we were particularly interested in the negative variant
of intent interpretations, that is intent interpretatios with respect to displays of negative affect or
motivation. As described in Förster et al. [14] the effect of the robot’s affective displays on partic-
ipants’ speech was remarkable, and did confirm the potential of intent interpretations as source
for negation words. We use the results of the rejection experiment within the present article as
point of reference to assess the comparative efficacy of the prohibition task in terms of the ac-
quisition of negation words. The language acquisition architecture employed in the present study
is identical to the one used in the rejection experiment. For the learning to be efficacious, the
system relies on strong interactional regularities that operate on relatively small time windows
of several hundred milliseconds to very few seconds. More simply expressed, the human parent,
teacher, or tutor needs to express the relevant word roughly at the time when the respective ref-
erent or affective expression is present. We will refer to this as the simultaneity constraint. In the
paradigmatic joint attentional frames, that feature centrally in modern developmental account of
language acquisition, the simultaneity contraint can be assumed to be fulfilled by default: a triadic
joint attentional frame is only given, when all three components of the triad are temporally co-
present: tutor, learner, and referent. In Saunders’ experiments, which focussed on the acquisition
of object labels and properties, the simultaneity constraint was typically also adhered to by the
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup and interactive robot behaviors as utilized in the experiment. Participants and
robot face each other. The teaching objects are located between the two interactants on a table. Upper left:
Looking around behavior: no object is being presented to the robot. Upper right: Reaching behavior: triggered
by a participant’s presentation of an object with positive valence. Lower left, Avoidance behavior: triggered
by a participant’s presentation of an object with negative valence. Lower right: Modified reaching behavior,
executed in prohibition experiment, where participants can push back the robot’s arm to prevent it from
touching a forbidden object.
participants. All other existing approaches on symbol grounding in developmental robotics do not
make use of naïve participants, and appear to avoid unconstrained speech. There, the simultaneity
constraint is typically enforced by either using trained participants, or system designers that are
aware of the systems’s technical limitations and the underlying assumptions. In either case the
human interlocutors produce the right kind of words or utterances the right time in line with the
system requirements. We refer to this type of interaction as “designer-robot interaction.”
Another property of intent interpretations appears to be that they involve a certain asymmetry
between the speakers: one party is conversationally leading or stronger, typically themother or the
teacher-participant, while the other party is conversationally weaker or inept such as the infant
or the child-humanoid.
2.4 Overview of Prohibition Experiment
The prohibition experiment was an attempt to test Spitz’ hypothesis in a human-robot interaction
setup: Do linguistic prohibitions on part of the language tutors constitute likely candidates as
functional origins of negation words? Instead of testing the hypothesis in isolation, we decided
to test it alongside the hypothesis of the rejection experiment on intent interpretations as likely
origins. The prohibition experiment is a genuine extension of the rejection experiment: both the
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robot’s behavior as well as participants’ task from the rejection experiment are taken as baseline,
and are subsequently extended to elict linguistic prohibitions from participants.
3 MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1 Study Design
Asmentioned earlier, the prohibition experimentwas designed in close alignment with the rejection
experiment [14]. The robot’s behavior developed for the rejection experiment formed the baseline
behavior for the rejective scenario of the prohibition experiment (Figure 2). The cognitive and
behavioral architecture employed was identical to the one employed in the rejection experiment
with an extension that enabled the robot to cope with and react to being physically restrained.
Every instantiation of the prohibition experiment consisted of five interactive sessions of approx-
imately 5 minutes each. The multi-session format facilitated linguistic development over time and
was required for the purpose of post-processing of participants’ speech recordings.
Participants and robot were seated at opposite ends of a small table that contained several
marked boxes and that constituted the to-be-taught objects (see Figure 1). Participants were told
to teach the robot the names of these objects. The objects had randomly assigned valences for the
robot that participants were initially not aware of. These would modulate the robot’s motivation
system and thereby trigger different behaviors (see next section).
Participants’ speech was recorded via headsets and each session was video-recorded. Partici-
pants were not alone with the robot but either one or two more people were present. An operator
was required to monitor the robot, and most often a helper was present to put boxes back on the
table that had been dropped by the iCub robot Deechee. In few sessions the helper was absent
such that the operator had to perform both tasks. As depicted in Figure 1, participant and robot
were facing each other with a table separating the two. The teaching objects were 10-cm-long
cardboard cubes that had black-and-white depictions of various shapes glued to each side of each
box. The shapes were a square, a triangle, a star, a heart, and a crescent moon and all sides of a
box showed identical shapes. Participants first read the instructions and signed the consent form.
Afterwards they took their seat opposite the iCub and were subsequently asked to count down
“three, two, one, start.” So “start” acted as start marker for the session. After approximately five
minutes the operator would give participants a signal. The operator, upon hearing “start,” would
press a button. This led to a time stamp being broadcasted through the architecture, which was
recorded by the robot’s body memory.
3.2 Robot Behavior
Both experiments utilized a motivation system that modulated the robot’s affective expressions.
These expressions were the facial expressions smiling, frowning, neutral, and matching body be-
haviors. Apart from modulating the robot’s body behavior, its affective state was also fed into the
symbol grounding system. As was the case in the rejection experiment, the robot’s affective states
were triggered by above mentioned object valences towards objects that were presented to it. The
robot would attempt to grasp the object, in the case of a positive valence, or avoid it in the case
of a negative valence. In addition, and differing from the rejection experiment, the robot’s motiva-
tional state would also turn negative if it experienced external restriction of its arm movement. In
absence of the aforementioned motivational triggers, the robot would display a baseline behavior
during which it would alternate its gaze between the present objects and the participant’s face.
If participants presented an object with a positive valence to the robot, then it would smile and
hold out its hand towards them. It presented its palm, which signaled to participants that they
could give it an object if they chose to do so (reaching behavior).
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Fig. 2. Alignment of Prohibition and Rejection Experiment: Prohibition and Rejection in the table refer
to the prohibition and rejection scenarios, respectively. Note that the prohibition experiment is composed
of both the prohibition and rejection scenarios, whereas the rejection experiment consists of the rejection
scenario only. Brackets ({..}) indicate the permutations of the following values: the robot either “liked” (L),
“disliked” (D), or “felt”’ neutral (N) about an object. Only participants knew whether an object was allowed A
or prohibited/forbidden (P) for the robot to touch. The mapping of positive/negative/neutral (+/-/0) valences to
objects was permuted between sessions, such that each object was twice liked, twice disliked, and once neutral
across the 5 sessions (see Table 1). The mappings were identical for every participant. The allowed/forbidden
markers were permuted as well.
If a participant presented an object with negative valence to the robot, then it looked at the
object briefly, started to frown, and turned its head away. The dynamics of the interaction can lead
to several consecutive “turn away” movements, which some participants interpreted as a form of
head shake.
When presented with an object with neutral valence, the iCub displayed a neutral facial expres-
sion. Additionally it looked in regular intervals at both the participant’s face and the presented
object without approaching it (watching behavior). Prior to participants selecting the first object,
but also between object presentations, the robot displayed a neutral face and switched its focus
between all objects and the participant’s face (looking around behavior).
The major driver of the robot’s behaviors is thus its motivation system. The motivation system,
in turn, is modulated by the external object valences as well as physical restriction of its arm
movement. The latter has an exclusively negative impact and there is no positive counterpart.
The duration of the robot’s gaze on a particular target were variable, and the time constants
controlling the robot’s gaze behavior were set to ones listed in the supporting materials (SM,
Table 3).
During the first 3 sessions, approximately half of the objects were additionally tagged with
markers, and participants were instructed to prevent the robot from touching these—the prohi-
bition task. The last 2 sessions of the prohibition experiment are identical to the rejection setup
such that the robot’s success in acquiring negation words could be compared between the two
experiments.
3.2.1 Rejection Scenario. The robot’s behavior in the rejection scenario is the general behavior
described above, but without extensions for the prohibition task. To increase the likelihood of the
production of negative intent interpretations, we permuted the object-valence mapping for each
session (see Table 1). In this way it was impossible for participants to know which object the robot
would dislike at the outset of a particular session. This usually meant that they would present
every disliked object at least once.
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Table 1. Object Valences Per Session for Both
Prohibition and Rejection Experiment
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
triangle 1 −1 1 −1 0
moon 0 1 −1 1 −1
square −1 0 1 −1 1
heart 1 −1 0 1 −1
circle −1 1 −1 0 1
3.2.2 Prohibition Scenario. Extending the rejective scenario the prohibition scenario includes
the prohibition task to elicit prohibitive utterances from participants. To this purpose two or three
of the five present objects were declared to be forbidden, and were marked with colored dots on the
side facing the participants. In addition to the instructions from the rejection scenario participants
were told that the marked objects were forbidden objects, and that Deechee was not allowed to
touch them. To keep Deechee from touching these forbidden boxes, participants were instructed
to physically restrain the robot, in case it tried to touch them. Before the first session, participants
were shown how to push the robot’s arm back, first, to show them the ideal contact point, such
that the robot’s hand would not be damaged, and second, to take away their potential fear from
actually touching the robot. The ideal contact point is the wrist and forearm. In this scenario, force
control was used as the control mode for both arms, which makes it possible for participants to
manipulate the arms while the robot executes a movement [31]. The act of pushing the robot’s
arm is detected as physical resistance and registered by the perception system as resistance event.
The occurrence of such a resistance event leads to the robot’s motivation being set to negative:
Deechee subsequently starts to frown. Furthermore the face-related gaze time is increased to give
this emotional display a slightly higher intensity (see SM Table 3).
The assignment of the forbidden and allowed attributes was such that every combination of
liked/disliked with allowed/forbidden would occur at least once within each session. This, together
with the change of the valence-to-object mapping between subsequent sessions (Table 1) then led
automatically to a permutation of the allowed and disallowed attribute-to-object mappings across
sessions. In general, there were either two or three forbidden objects per session, and two or three
allowed ones.
In terms of the role reversal mentioned by Spitz none was needed as, in our architecture, there
is neither a concept of self nor of other. For the prohibition experiment the behavioral trigger
mechanism was modified such that negative motivation caused by participants’ restriction of the
robot’s arm movement would not trigger its avoidance behavior. In these cases the robot would
nevertheless frown in accordance with its motivational state.
3.3 Speech Processing, Symbol Grounding, and Speech-related Robot Behavior
The processing of participants’ speech, as well as the symbol grounding was performed in be-
tween experimental sessions. The recorded speech was transcribed and speech recording and
transcript manually re-aligned as the automatic alignment was not precise enough for the sub-
sequent prosody recognition. Both participants’ speech and the recorded sensorimotor and mo-
tivation (smm) data were timestamped to allow for temporal alignment in the symbol grounding
phase.
From every utterance the prosodically most salient word was extracted, and the co-occurring
sensorimotor-motivational (smm) data was attached to the word. At this point the temporal si-
multaneity mentioned in Section 2 becomes crucial: Those parts of the smm data are considered
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relevant, which were recorded during the production of the respective utterance. From this point
on, the salient word is grounded in the robot’s embodied “experience.” After all of the partici-
pant’s utterances had been processed in this manner, the new set of so grounded words is added
to the robot’s embodied lexicon. Note that a separate lexicon is created for each participant such
that the robot follows an independent acquisition trajectory for every participant. The fact that it
starts with an empty lexicon for each participant means that no designer knowledge in terms of
a set of preselected words is incorporated. Everything that the robot eventually said during the
experiment originated from what the respective participant had uttered in earlier sessions.
In every session but the first the lexicon was loaded into a memory-based learning system [8].
Importantly, the robot is real-time deaf, i.e., no real-time speech detection is in place. Rather than
answering to questions, certain trigger behaviors will make the robot query its embodied lexicon.
Trigger behaviors are behaviors which are caused by object presentations: grasping for, rejecting,
or simply watching a presented object. Whenever the robot is engaged in one of these trigger
behaviors, it matches its smm state against those associated to words in its current embodied
lexicon and retrieves the best match. While a trigger behavior is active this process is continuously
performed, which means at about 30 Hertz. As it is both impossible and impractical to speak at
such a high rate, and because we expect a certain level of noise within the smm data, a thresholding
mechanism is employed. This mechanism both stabilizes its linguistic output with respect to noise
as well as adjusts its speech frequency to a more plausible level. The thresholding mechanism
maintains a score for each best match word: The score of the respective word is increased whereas
all other word scores are decreased. Once the score of a particular word reaches a certain threshold,
the word is sent to the speech synthesizer: The robot speaks. After it spoke, all scores are reset
to 0. The retrieval process now starts anew but on a reduced lexicon: the just-synthesized word
has been removed. The removed word is added back to the lexicon once another word has been
synthesized but also if a change in the smm state occurs.
3.4 Recruiting and Distribution of Participants
We recruited 10 participants all of whom were native English speakers and which were gender-
balanced. The majority of participants were students or university employees and were naïve with
respect to the true purpose of the experiment. In other words, the participants were unaware that
linguistic negation was the topic under investigation. They were remunerated with £20 once they
completed all five sessions. The protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the University of
Hertfordshire under protocol number 0809/88, and approval was extended under protocol number
1112/42.
3.5 Instructions to Participants
To increase the likelihood of participants employing a speech register akin to child-directed speech,
we asked them to imagine the robot as a pre-linguistic child. We also stated that the robot would
like certain objects and dislike others. We used identical instructions in both the rejection [14] as
well as the present prohibition experiment both of which, in turn, were very similar to Saunders’
experiment [38]. The majority of instructions in both negation experiments as well as Saunders’
experiment [38] were identical: participants were told that they ought to teach the robot Deechee
about the objects on the table. We tried to prime participants into adopting a style of speech akin to
child-directed speech (CDS, [15, 27, 43]) by telling them to imagine Deechee to be a two-year-old. In
addition towhat participantswere told in Saunders’ experiment, we also decided tomention to them
that Deechee had likes and dislikes with respect to the objects such that they would not be caught
by surprise by Deechee’s emotional displays. It is not clear whether the latter instruction was
strictly necessary, and whether it had any impact in terms of the content and style of participants’
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Fig. 3. Functional overview of robotic architecture for language acquisition. Solid lines indicate com-
ponents that are active during experimental sessions (“online”), dotted lines indicate components that work
offline.
speech. Only in the prohibition experiment participants were told that the marked objects on the
table were forbidden for Deechee to touch. Participants were instructed to push the robot’s arm
away if it should approach these objects and they were practically shown how to do this.
3.6 Behavioral Architecture
The behavior architecture that generates both the humanoid’s bodily and linguistic behaviour
consists of the components depicted in Figure 3. We will sketch each component’s purpose only
very shortly as more elaborate descriptions have already been provided in References [12, 14].
The perception system gathers and processes percepts of all modalities. Visual processing was
limited to face and object detection and based on the system developed by Rüsch et al. [36]. We
also developed a detector for object-related pick up actions.
The motivation system is responsible for generating the affective-motivational state of the
robot, which consists of a simple scalar value between −1 and 1: −1 corresponds to a negative, +1
a positive, and a small band around 0 a neutral state (cf. Varela et al. [52, Chapter 6]).
The body behavior system generates the humanoid robot’s physical behavior, which also in-
cludes its facial expressions. The behavior is generated contingent upon the inputs from the per-
ception and the motivation system. The behaviors are Rejecting,Watching, Looking around, Reach-
ing for object, and Idle. Other subsystems are informed of changes in the bodily behavior by the
broadcasting of unique behavior ids. Relevant time constants for certain parts of the behavior such
as the eye gaze are listed in Table 3 of the supporting materials.
The body memory saves high-level and low-level perceptual data as well as behavior ids and
the robot’s motivational state to a file.
The auditory system encompasses speech recognition, word alignment, prosodic labeling, and
word extraction, and are based on Saunders’ system [40]. Utterance boundaries are set based on
statistics of inter-word pause durations and word durations (see Saunders et al. [40] for details).
Important for the later analysis is the notion of prosodic saliency. Note in this context that the first
three aforementioned subsystems produce a sequence of utterances, where each utterance consists
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Fig. 4. Sensorimotor-motivational ( smm ) vector. Solid linesmark those data dimensions that were used
for symbol grounding and matching; bid: behavior id, oid: object id, faceDet: face detected, moti: motivation
value, resist: resistance detected, encX: encoder #X.
of prosodically annotated words. Exactly one word is extracted per utterance, and that word is the
prosodically most salient one. Prosodic salience is calculated as f0 ∗ enerдy ∗ dw , where f0 is the
maximum fundamental frequency, enerдy is the maximum energy, dw is the word duration, and
all of these components are normalized before said formula is applied.
The lexical grounding system performs the association of smm data with the salient words
originating from the auditory system (see Figure 9). The so grounded words are subsequently
added to the embodied lexicon.
The languaging system generates the robot’s speech. It does so based on a process thatmatches
the robot’s current smm state (Figure 4) against the smm states associated to words in the embodied
lexicon yielding a best-matching word in combination with a thresholding mechanism. At the core
of the matching process is the k-nearest neighbor implementation Tilburg Memory-based Learner
[50]. A new matching is performed whenever a new smm-vector is available, which is the case
approximately every 30ms. The repetitive uttering of the same word is prevented by the use of a
so called differential lexicon, which prevents the repeated production of the most recently uttered
word. For details of both the thresholding mechanism and the differential lexicon, see Förster et al.
[12, 14].
4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The independent variables in our experimental setup are the constitutive conditions of the two
experiments: the presence of rejective behavior and display on part of the robot in the rejection
experiment, and, additionally, the prohibition task and the accompanying body behavior of the
robot in the prohibition experiment.
The data analysis, the results of which are reported in Section 5, is based on approximately 5
hours of participants’ speech originating from 50 sessions—10 participants with 5 sessions each,
gathered within the prohibition experiment (cf. SM Table 10). As was the case for the rejection
experiment, analyses were performed on the word or corpus level, the utterance level, and the
pragmatic level for negative words and utterances. Each level of analysis yielded dependent vari-
ables linked to one of the research hypothesis formulated at the end of this section. The dependent
variables that will be used within the hypotheses are in the following marked as such (“DV”). The
analysis will only be sketched as a more elaborate description has already been given in Reference
[14].
The following variables were measured on the level of utterances: speech frequency in utter-
ances per minute (u/min), mean length of utterance (MLU), and the number of distinct words (cf.
Figure 7 and SM Table 10).
More important for the purpose of understanding negation, are the counts of negative utter-
ances per minute (nu/min, DV), where negative utterances are utterances that contain at least one
negative word. Whether a word is a negation word was determined manually by examining the
complete list of distinct words compiled from all participants’ speech transcripts.
On the corpus-level the prohibition corpus (PC) is a list of all words and their frequencies that
occur in participants’ speech transcripts taken from the prohibition experiment. The PCS is a subset
of the PC containing only those words that were marked prosodically salient. Both corpora are
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Fig. 5. Taxonomy of negation types used by participants. Conv.: conversationally, 1st part-pair, 2nd
part-pair: parts of an adjacency pair such as question (1st part-pair)-answer (2nd part-pair).
presented together with the corresponding corpora from the rejection and Saunders’ experiment:
RC, SC, RCS, and SCS (cf. Figure 7(C)). On this level the most relevant number are the frequency
ranks of negation words (DV), predominantly “no” and “don’t,” within the corpora of prosodically
salient words. Only prosodically salient words enter the robots embodied lexicon. To be able to
classify negative utterances of both participants and robot by their communicative function, their
pragmatic type of sorts, we constructed two taxonomies, Figures 5 and 6. The construction process
is described in Förster et al. [12, 14], but we emphasize that the resulting types can be regarded
as types of speech acts in a loose sense, which were enriched by the notion of conversational
adjacency. Conversational adjacency is not part of classical speech act theory [3, 41]. A short
sketch of the most important negation types is given below, but for a detailed description of all
types, we refer to the coding scheme [13]. Upon completion of the two taxonomies two coders
classified the negative utterances by type, where the first coder classified all utterances, and the
second coder classified a randomly selected subset comprising 20% of all utterances. This enabled
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Fig. 6. Taxonomy of robot negation types. Types of negative utterances produced by the robot and as
identified by external coders.
us to assess the taxonomies for internal consistency using Cohen’s κ. Prior to coding the negative
utterances for type, required for identifying intent interpretations, or prohibitions (DV), amongst
other negation types, the coders coded the robots’ utterances for felicity (DV). This means that
they had to make a judgment whether they, by virtue of being fluent English speakers, perceive
the negative robot utterance to be adequate or plausible in the respective conversational context.
The internal consistency of the human taxonomy in terms of Cohen’s κ was judged to be good
(κ = 0.74), but the consistency of the robot taxonomy was judged to be only borderline acceptable,
which triggered an automatic attempt to optimize it. Both the optimization attempt as well as our
reasons for not adopting the recommended mergers suggested by the optimization are described
in Förster et al. [12, 14]. Important for our current purposes is the fact that the κ values for the
ratings of both the robot’s felicity (κ = 0.46) and type (κ = 0.41) are at the very lower end of what
is generally regarded acceptable. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting numbers that are
based on these ratings. Importantly, however, there was no indication that any one of the two
coders would have judged the robot’s negative speech systematically more favorably as compared
to the other (see SM Table 3).
Prior to describing the outcome of these attempts, we need to introduce the negation types
mentioned within the present article. These include the ones most frequently produced during the
experiments. A complete listing of all observed negation types can be found in the coding scheme
[13]. In the following those types typically found in human participants’ speech are qualified with
“[H].” The types typically found in the robot’s speech are marked “[R].” In the examples question
marks indicate the intonational contour of a question, full stops the contour of an assertion.
Negative Intent Interpretations (NII [H]) are negative interpretations or ascriptions with
regards to the addressee’s motivational, emotional, or volitional state [33, p. 179].
Example utterances falling into this category are “No, you don’t like fish” or a simple “No” if it
is not produced as a genuine question.
Negative Motivational Questions (NMQ [H]) are very similar to NIIs in that they refer to the
addressee’s perceived negative motivational state. The main difference between NIIs and NMQs
is the fact that the latter are considered genuine questions, meaning, the speaker does expect
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the addressee to respond. Examples would be “Are you not feeling well today?” or “You don’t like
apples?” in the context of being offered an apple, rather than the statement of a general preference.
Truth-functional Denials (TFD [H]) are used to deny a truth-functional assertion, with truth-
functional assertions being assertions whose truth is independent of either speaker’s preferences
or capabilities. Examples are “No, it’s not a hedgehog!” in the presence of an unknown animal and
counter the suggestion of some other speaker or, again, a simple “No” in reply to some positive
assertion.
Truth-functional Negations (TFN [H]) in our taxonomy are a catch-all category for all
of those kinds of truth-functional negation that are not truth-functional denials, such as truth-
functional suggestions or speculations, but also negative normative assertions such as, “In England
you mustn’t drive on the right-hand side.”
Prohibitions (P [H]) are negative utterances whose function is to prevent the addressee from
doing something. Considered in isolation, such utterances may not indicate that their function
was prohibitive (cf. example 2). Taken out of context this utterance may be taken to be a truth-
functional negation. However, in context, when looking at a video recording of the actual interac-
tion, or when witnessing the latter “in vivo,” it becomes clear that this utterance is used as prohibi-
tion. In our experiment the prohibitive utterance can or cannot be accompanied by the participant
physically restraining the robot’s arm movement.
Example 1: “No, you can’t touch that.”
Example 2: “No you’re not holding it, but you can look at them.”
Disallowance (D [H]) Disallowances are similar to prohibitions but, in contrast, capture those
utterances that express general negative rules. In this sense disallowance utterances are more de-
tached from the here and now of the interaction than prohibitive utterances. Whereas prohibitive
utterances are always triggered by a current action on part of the robot, disallowances can or cannot
accompany such an action.
Example: Speaker A takes something from the shelf and shows it to the robot saying “You can’t
have this one.”
Negative agreements (A [H+R]) are negative confirmations in response to a negative state-
ment such as a “no,” uttered by speaker 2 in response or addition to a “So you don’t like peanut
butter, hmm?” by speaker 1.
Motivation-dependent Denials [R] are negative answers tomotivation-dependent questions or
assertions. Their content is dependent on the current emotional or volitional state of the addressee
or her current preferences.
Example: “No” in response to “Do you want some ice cream?”
Rejections [R] are very close tomotivation-dependent denials. The difference is that the latter is
adjacent to an utterance whereas the former is adjacent or in reaction to non-linguistic offers. For
example, “no” in response to someone holding out an apple as a offer would fall into this category.
Negative tag question (NTQ [H]) are negative clauses that are attached to the end of the
utterance. Semantically and pragmatically they are probably the “least negative” of our negation
types but they are easy to spot and appear to be highly frequent in British English. For example
“don’t you” as in “You do like it, don’t you?” falls into this category. Another example would be
“haven’t you” in “You have been to Cambridge, haven’t you?”
Once the speech recordings had been processed in this manner, we calculated statistics, where
possible, such as the number of the various negation types per experiment. By linking the results of
the pragmatic coding with the data that arose from the speech processing and symbol grounding,
we could also start to answer questions about the frequency of certain negation words within the
various negation types, and their prosodic saliency. In addition to the linguistic analyses a further
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analysis on the temporal relationships between participants’ linguistic prohibition and their use
of bodily measures to restrain the robot was performed (cf. SM Section A.4.1).
4.1 Research Hypotheses
Based on the introduced experimental variables, and given the research questions from Sec-
tion 1.1.2, the research hypotheses are as follows. The research questions each hypothesis links up
with are stated in brackets at the end.
(H1) Human tutors, when confronted with a defiant humanoid robot, and in the presence
of forbidden objects, produce more linguistic prohibitions as compared to the rejection
scenario where such objects are absent. (∼Q2)
(H2) Assuming that H1 holds, prohibitions contain at least as many negation words as do
negative intent interpretations. (∼Q3, Q4)
(H3) Assuming that H1 holds, the prosodic saliency of negation words within prohibitions is
as high or higher than the one observed in negative intent interpretations. (∼Q3, Q4)
(H4) Assuming thatH1 holds, the felicity rate of the robot’s negative utterances will be higher
than what was observed in the rejection experiment. (∼Q5)
5 RESULTS
In the prohibition experiment, on average, every seventh to eighth utterance of participants con-
tains a negation word, which constitutes an increase of 391% compared to the speech recorded
in Saunders’ scenario (cf. Figure 7). This compares to a rise of 332% in the rejection experiment.
The frequent occurrence of negative utterances leads to a large increase of prosodically salient
negation words, which subsequently enter the robot’s active vocabulary. The increase is amplified
by the relatively high prosodic saliency rate of “no” in both negation experiments. The prosodic
saliency of negation words, chiefly “no,” is high both in relation to Saunders’ experiment as well
as in relation to the average word saliency within the negation experiments (Figure 8(A)). As a
consequence ‘no’ rises to the fourth rank in the prohibition corpus of salient words PCS, and even
to second rank in the corresponding RCS (Figure 7).
Hypothesis 1. Analysing these negative utterances with respect to their communicative func-
tion reveals that, within the prohibition experiment, linguistic prohibitions, not present within the
rejection experiment, occupy the top-rank, making up 21% of all negative utterances. Our results
hence corroborate hypothesis 1: our participants did indeed produce a multitude of linguistic pro-
hibitions in response to the presence of the prohibition task.
The high rate of prohibitions relative to all produced negation types is remarkable as linguistic
prohibitions were only produced when the prohibition task was given, i.e., during the first three
sessions, whereas utterances of the other types were produced in all of the five sessions. Prohi-
bitions are followed by negative intent interpretations (18%), negative motivational questions (18%),
and truth-functional denials (11%) (cf. Figure 8 and SM Table 4), with prosodic saliency rates of
60.5%, 38.2%, 41.8%, and 31.7%, respectively.
This means the three motivation-dependent types provide the majority of negation words for
the robot’s lexicon due to two factors: First, these types of utterances are dominant in terms of the
absolute numbers of productions, and, second, the negation words that are part of these utterances
have higher rates of prosodic saliency than the truth-functional types.
In comparison, within the rejection experiment, at 31% the most frequent negation type, are
negative intent interpretations (NII), followed by negative motivational questions (NMQ, 30%). Both
of these types have a direct link to the robot’s display of affect. Truth-functional denials (TFD)
rank third (22%) in the RC but have a lower saliency rate (29%), relative to the two motivational
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Fig. 7. Impact of motivated behavior on linguistic production of participants. (A) The overall production
rates between prohibition (upper red), rejection (lower black), and Saunders’ experiment (middle blue) differ
only marginally (mean ± SEM). (B) The production rate of negative utterances only, however, is significantly
higher in the prohibition (upper red) and rejection (middle black) as compared to Saunders’ experiment.
See Supporting Information for details. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 (C) The large supply of negative utterances
has consequences on the corpus level: No is amongst the 10 most frequent words in the rejection and the
prohibition corpus, whereas it is located on rank 50 in Saunders’ corpus. In the corpora of prosodically salient
words no ranks even higher. This is due to the high saliency of the word and it subsequently enters the robot’s
vocabulary frequently. (Arrows (↑) indicate equality of ranks between the stated entry and the next entry
above. Negation words are marked through gray background. The “+1” row contains the 20th most-frequent
words unless a different rank is specified in brackets.)
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Fig. 8. (A) Frequency of human utterances classified as being of the stated negation types (pragmatic
level) and percentage of utterances falling under the respective type with salient negation word (only types
with >5% of total number of negative utterances, Pro: Prohibition Experiment, Rej: Rejection Experiment).
(B) Prosodic saliency rates of selected words and word groups. “No” has a considerably higher salience rate in
the two negation experiments as compared to Saunders’ experiment. PC: Prohibition Corpus, RC: Rejection
Corpus, SC: Saunders et al.’s Corpus.
types (NII: 54%, NMQ: 49%). From this we can conclude that in the rejection experiment the vast
majority of negation words in the robot’s active vocabulary originate from utterances of the two
motivation-dependent types, NIIs and NMQs.
When comparing the two negation experiments, it becomes clear that within the prohibition
experiment negative intent interpretations and negative motivational questions were produced less
frequently than was the case in the rejection experiment. The probable cause for this is the fact
that, in both experiments, participants had overall the same amount of time, yet participants in the
prohibition experiment spent part of their time with attempts to prohibit the robot leaving them
less time to engage in NIIs and NMQs.
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Table 2. Statistical Comparison of Felicity Rates of iCub’s Negative Utterances
Criterion Experiment Felicity rate (%) Test result
mean (std)
crit. 1
Rejection 74.40 (23.80)
t (14) = 3.09,p = 0.008
Prohibition 32.57 (30.31)
crit. 2
Rejection 64.16 (19.80)
t (10) = 3.17,p = 0.013
Prohibition 28.02 (17.08)
Given are the mean and standard deviation for the felicity rates of the robot’s production of
negation during sessions 4 and 5. Two criteria: Crit. 1: Data basis is felicity values of all but
those where the robot did not produce any negative utterances (sessions with P01, P06, P10,
and P18). Crit. 2: Data basis as in crit. 1 plus additional exclusion of those felicity rates based
on less than 10 utterances, that is, additional exclusion of sessions with P04, P09, P13, P19,
and P22. See Table 15 for a more detailed breakdown of the robot’s success rates itemized by
participant and negation type.
Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis is confirmed by the analysis of the experimental data. When con-
sidering the saliency rates of negation words within utterances of the aforementioned types pro-
duced within the prohibition experiment it becomes clear that linguistic prohibitions constitute a
formidable source of negation words: within this type, negation words reach the overall highest
saliency rate (61%), followed by negativemotivational questions (41%), negative intent interpretations
(38%), and truth-functional denials (32%) (see SM Table 5 for the complete listing). The combina-
tion of high production rate and high saliency rate renders them the top contributors of negation
words to the robot’s active vocabulary within this experiment.
Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis is being confirmed by the data analysis. Every single prohibitive
utterance contained at least one negation word whereas intent interpretations and motivational
questions were sometimes performed in a non-negative way. Some participants for example used
non-negative emotion words in response to the robot’s negative affective display such as ‘sad’ as
in “why are you sad?” where others more commonly used the negative “you don’t like it?” Thus,
from amerely lexical perspective, prohibitions appear to bemore reliable sources of negationwords
than intent interpretations and motivational questions.
In Saunders’ experiment in comparison “no,” is ranked 50th in the SC and 32nd in the SCS. There
it accounts for less than 0.5% of words in both corpora. Hence, both the affective or motivational
displays of the robot as well as the prohibition task lead to a considerably higher rate of negative
utterances when compared to the setup used by Saunders et al., who used a near-identical setup
but without affective displays and without prohibition task.
Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis has not been confirmed. To our surprise the robot’s learning suc-
cess with respect to negation was judged to be considerably lower in the prohibition (∼28–33%)
as compared to the rejection experiment (∼65–74%, see Table 2).
This result triggered an additional analysis where we aligned the signal representing external
pressure on the robot’s right arm with both the robot’s affective state as well as the timing of neg-
ative utterances of the four most frequent negation types, the details of which are provided in the
supporting materials (Section A.4.1) This analysis showed that participants from the prohibition
experiment 46% of the time did not physically restrain the robot’s arm when uttering prohibitions
as instructed, and in 12% of all cases uttered prohibitions before applying restraint (cf. SM Table 16).
In both cases grounded words enter the robot’s lexicon where the negation word is likely to be as-
sociated with positive affect (see SM Table 17). This may then lead to the inappropriate usage of the
word. In only 18% of cases did our participants utter prohibitions while restraining the robots arm,
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that is, while it was in a negative affective state. When performing a similar analysis for negative
intent interpretations, we observed that in approximately two thirds of cases (rejection experiment:
66%, prohibition experiment: 63%) the robot is in a negative motivational state as opposed to a pos-
itive one (rejection experiment: 9%, prohibition experiment: 6%) such that there is a high likelihood
of it associating the negative word with negative affect. For negative motivational questions the re-
sults look similar within the prohibition experiment (58% performed while in a negative state, and
only 9% while in a positive state), while in the rejection experiment the number of performances
while in a negative state (40%) is nearly identical to the number of performances while in a neu-
tral state (41%). Performances of this type while the robot is in a positive state are also not very
frequent within this experiment (19%). Thus, albeit lexically not being equally reliable sources of
negation words as prohibitions, negative intent interpretations appear to be better sources for the
establishment of an association of the negative wordwith negative affect if word learning is mainly
modeled as a process of establishing associations between sensorimotor-affective ‘concepts’ and
linguistic items.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 ResearchQuestions Answered
6.1.1 Q1: Are Affect or Motivation Necessary Requirements in the Acquisition of Negation? Under
the assumption that the constructive methodology that we have chosen is a valid means to explore
genuinely human phenomena such as language, our experiments corroborate the assertion that
“having” affect or motivation is a crucial ingredient when it comes to acquiring negation words.
In both negation experiments the presence of affective or motivated behavior on part of the robot
caused significant changes in human tutors’ speech behavior.Where they had produced close to no
negation words in a nearly identical tutoring setup in Saunders’ experiments, their production was
abundant in both negation experiments. In addition to the strong rise in the frequency of negation
words, these words were also prosodically salient to a level that is matched only by object labels
and emotion-related words. This makes them likely to be picked out from the speech stream by a
budding language learner.
6.1.2 Q2: Do Human Participants Produce Prohibitions in a HRI-setup Akin to what Can be
Observed in Parent-child Dyads? If the setup is similar to the one we have used, then the answer is
a simple “yes.” Participants’ speech behavior was in this respect what one would intuitively expect
in the given situation if the dyad would have been parent-child: it is abundant with prohibitions.
As there is no quantitative data on the parental use of prohibitions in parent-child conversation,
more detailed comparisons cannot be made at this point.
6.1.3 Q3: Are Prohibitions Good Sources for Negation Words? Prohibitions are excellent sources
for negation words, for two reasons: Every single prohibition that we encountered contained a
negation word, and in a large percentage of them a negation word was the prosodically salient
word of that utterance.
6.1.4 Q4: How do Prohibitions Compare to Negative Intent Interpretations? While negative in-
tent interpretations are already very good sources for negation words (cf. Förster et al. [14]), from
a lexical and prosodic perspective, prohibitions are even better sources for the reasons stated in
our answer to question 3.
6.1.5 Q5: Did the Robot’s Felicity Rate Improve Due to Exposure to the Tutor’s Prohibition? No,
it did not. Compared to the rejection experiment the adequacy of the robot’s use of negation wors-
ened considerably. The main reason for this surprising lack of improvement appears to be that the
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simultaneity constraint mentioned in Section 2.3 had been frequently violated. In other words: the
robot was not in a negative affective state at the time when prohibitions were produced by the
participants. Whether or not this is equivalent to what would be observed with parent-child dyads
is unknown due to the lack of sufficiently detailed comparative data in the child language litera-
ture. More generally, there is no quantitative psycholinguistic data that we could use to compare
the robot’s felicity rate to those of young children when it comes to the use of negation words.
Documented in the literature are semantic mistakes during certain developmental stages such as
the over-generalisation of nouns [16] and grammatical constructions [5, 6]. Unfortunately there is
no such data for “pragmatic accuracy” in terms of the (non-)successful use of negation words such
as “no.”
Despite the lack of comparative data, we hypothesize that our behavioral setup and learning
architecture were most likely somewhat too simplistic to handle the complexities of multimodal
prohibitive behavior. Intuitively a 30% success rate appears to be very low. Here are the reasons
why we think that our setup was too simplistic to “make proper use” of tutors’ prohibitions.
6.1.6 Why did the Robot Fail to Learn? Our participants, despite having been instructed on
how to physically prevent the robot from touching an object, often chose not to do so. Instead,
we observed that participants frequently held forbidden objects out of the robot’s reach instead
of limiting its arm movement. As the robot does not perform any type of goal-evaluation with
respect to having reached or touched the “desired” object it does not become frustrated in these
cases. While we are unaware of any existing studies on children’s acquisition of negation that
would provide us with the level of interaction detail that we would require (cf. SM Section A.4.1),
anecdotal evidence from our own children can give us some hints.
Having demonstrated to our participants how to physically keep the robot from touching a
forbidden object, we somewhat naïvely expected that they would just do that whenever the robot
engaged in such forbidden behavior. However, they did not. One explanation would be that our
participants’ were simply reluctant to touch the robot most of the time. In this case there would be
a mismatch between the synthetic model, the human-robot dyad, and its natural counterpart, the
parent-child dyad. A less innocent explanation in terms of the consequences for our behavioral
design would be that people generally do not excert corporal restraint easily but rather use other
means of keeping children from accessing what should not be accessed. One way of achieving
this is by simply putting the target object out of the toddler’s or robot’s reach, which is what
we have observed with some participants. Based on the aforementioned anecdotal evidence such
moves are likely to frustrate the toddler. However, putting object’s out of our robot’s reach did not
frustrate it due to relatively fundamental reasons: Hebbian-type algorithms do not make reference
to goal-states. In our architecture, we modeled world learning to be by and large associative or
Hebbian. This decision was not made on the basis on principle, but rather by the application of
Occam’s razor: Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, we chose one of the simplest types of
learning algorithms. Yu et al. [54] provide a more elaborate discussion on associative learning in
word acquisition.
One consequence of not having explicit goals on the level of the learning algorithm is that frus-
tration, that is, a state caused by not reaching a goal, or not reaching it within a certain time span,
is hard to model. In our architecture, frustration is not explictly modeled. Instead external physi-
cal restraint will directly trigger the robot’s negative affect, without the “intermediary” notion of
frustration.
6.1.7 Anecdotal Evidence on the Natural “Structure” of Prohibition. The lack of detail in the
developmental literature with respect to the precise temporal unfolding of prohibition led us to
search the video platformYouTube for amateur videos depicting parents that engage in prohibition.
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Albeit of a somewhat anecdotal character some videos show situations where parents clearly pro-
hibit their children by the mere use of speech and cause the child’s frustration as a consequence of
these “touch-less” acts of prohibition (“single whammy prohibition”) [45]. In other videos, how-
ever, prohibiting utterances are swiftly followed by a combination of corporal restraint and linguis-
tic prohibition akin to the behavior we expected our participants to engage in (“double whammy
prohibition”) [9]. Due to the anecdotal character of this evidence it is impossible to tell which of
these two variants of prohibition is more typical, whether one is the developmental precursor of
the other, or whether it is a matter of the severity of the violation rather than a matter of the de-
velopmental stage. It is not hard to imagine that a child, having been exposed to several instances
of “double whammy” prohibition, would learn that “resistance is futile” and that, as a consequence
of this learning process, “single-whammy” prohibition suffices to stop the child from engaging in
the prohibited behavior (variant A).
However, it seems equally plausible that prohibitive utterances may carry distinctive prosodic
features that let the child infer the caretaker’s negative emotional or volitional stance. We may
assume that a child in the relevant age range can perform simple inferences within a lay theory of
emotions or volition [29, 30]. If we then further assume that the child experiences the caretaker’s
relative interactional and interventional power on a daily basis, then the child should be able to
infer that resistance is futile without a need for prior exposure to “double whammy” prohibition
(variant B). The lack of more than anecdotal evidence prevents us from excluding one or both of
these possibilities.
6.1.8 Reinforcement Learning as Alternative? It may be of interest to observe that both variants
A and B require a more powerful class of learning algorithms than the simple Hebbian-type one
employed by us. Both of these variants assume that the agent learns about the efficacy of its actions
with respect to some goal. In machine learning, this would be typically modeled with some type
of reinforcement learning, which is arguably a more powerful class of learning algorithms than
simple Hebbian-type associative learning. The replacement or supplement of our memory-based
learner with some type of reinforcement learning as core learning mechanism and the explicit
modeling of goals would therefore most certainly increase the felicity rate when using negation
words. In this case the robot’s frustration could be triggered whenever it cannot reach an object
within a certain time frame and when this inability is caused by another agent. This would then
lead to a rise in the number of grounded negation words with negative motivation value in the
data set of the memory-based learner.
Under the assumption that prohibitive utterances are indeed the main source of children’s early
negation words, the only potential rescue for a purely associationistic account we can conceive
of hinges on the notion of emotional contagion [19] (variant C). It shares with variant A the idea
that acoustic or prosodic qualities of prohibitive utterances, potentially in conjunction with cor-
responding facial expressions, may carry an emotional charge. As we have seen from our data,
prohibitions are typically prosodically salient. Assuming that their acoustic properties may have
the potential to negatively impact the affective state of the recipient, corporal restraint might not
be necessary to “turn the infant’s mood sour.” Corporal restraint may indeed only be used by the
care-giver as the very last resort. If such a mechanism of acoustic affective contagion could be
implemented within our learning architecture, then we would arrive at a point where the non-
codified aspects of utterances would contribute to the modulation of an interlocutor’s affective
state, which in turn would form part of the basis for grounding the codified units of the same, or
adjacent utterances.
The difference between this account of emotional contagion (variant C) and variant A above is
that the former does not require any reasoning process operating on actions and goals. It ascribes
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to the parent the power to impact the child’s emotional state more or less directly by producing
utterances with a certain emotional charge. In the account under variant A the parents power to
affect the child’s motivational state is more indirect: The utterance’s emotional charge, rather than
impacting the child directly, is taken into account by the child’s goal-oriented reasoning process.
To be efficacious for grounding negative symbols this process must be social: the reasoning must
not only take into account the child’s own abilities and goals but also the abilities and goals of the
caretaker, and evaluate whether a caretaker’s intervention is likely if a certain action is chosen
and given the emotional payload of the previously received utterances and other communicative
emotional signals.
As can be seen from these considerations the degrees of freedom for potential modifications of
the learning architecture are many. Only studies with temporal high-resolution and multimodal
descriptions of parental prohibitive behavior have the potential to create the required comparative
data set. Once available, such data set could then not only provide us with better means to eval-
uate our results but also reduce the degrees of freedom for future modifications of our learning
architecture as indicated above.
In the context of the rejection experiment [14], we determined that a lack of proper timing, that
is uttering a “no” after a pause longer than the important 1 second threshold [22], caused confusion
in the coders when trying to determine themeaning of the word, andwill presumably cause similar
problems with the interactor. Similarly the choice between the hypothesized learning mechanisms
in the context of prohibitive utterances could be informed by detailed observations of timing.
Assuming that emotional appraisal processes are faster than inferential processes, the temporal
order between prohibitive utterances and the child’s overt emotional displays could provide clues
as to which of the two types of processes is at play.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Our architecture is the first to extend symbol grounding beyond the realm of sensorimotor-data to
encompass affect and motivation, which is in line with recent psychological studies [24]. We have
demonstrated the capacity to acquire generally felicitous non-referential linguistic behavior such
as negation in a developmental scenario with a humanoid robot developing an embodied lexicon
based on its sensorimotor motivational experience in interaction with naïve human participants.
Based on our results we cannot exclude any of the two hypotheses on the origin of negation, due to
a lack of sufficiently detailed data on the precise dynamics how prohibition in mother-child dyads
is enacted. We did show however, that at least from a lexical perspective prohibitive utterances are
formidable sources of negation words.
If more detailed data on the dynamics of prohibition were to become available, then the results
of the presented research can give strong indications with respect to the underlying acquisition
algorithm: If the majority of prohibitive utterances are uttered at a time when the child is already
frustrated, then Hebbian-style methods may suffice to ground negative words in negative affect.
Yet our analysis on the temporal alignment between bodily and linguistic behavior hints towards
principal limitations of Hebbian-style learning. If prohibitive utterances typically precede or may
even cause a child’s frustration, then Hebbian-style methods are unlikely to be efficacious for af-
fective grounding, because they require a certain amount of synchronicity between negative word
and negative affect. In this case, a more powerful type of learning algorithm would be required.
Reinforcement learning, potentially coupled or amplified by some form of social reward signals
would be a likely candidate class of learning algorithms. This view appears to be supported by
recent work in neuroscience, which posits a central role of reinforcement learning in biological
decision making [28], if we are willing to assume that language learning may recruit more general
learning mechanisms.
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